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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the next few decades, technological 
developments will permit military planners to focus an increasing 
amount of attention on the utilization of transnational spatial 
areas for military purposes. 1 The areas most likely to be affected 
include outer space, the polar zones, and the oceans.2 From the 
vantage of the strategic analyst, the militarization of such areas is 
attractive primarily because it would shift the locus of strategic 
conflict away from presently targeted inhabited areas3 and, as a 
result, increase the operational utility of highly destructive 
nuclear weapons. Though a shift of this nature admittedly has a 
certain appeal, in the final analysis it could well have a debilitating 
effect upon the semblance of international tranquility which now 
exists. A shift of the locus of strategic conflict would remove a 
good deal of the existing uncertainty about the extent of the 
destructive consequences of thermonuclear war, and with such a 
removal may go whatever constraints against that or any other 
• This study represents a portion of a lecture presented by the author during the 
Spring of 1979 as visiting lecturer to the seminar course on Legal Regulation of Interna-
tional Coercion, National Law Center, George Washington University. 
•• Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George 
Washington University (1978-1979). Member of the California Bar and the American Society 
of International Law. B.A. (With Honors), California State University (1973); J.D., Pepper-
dine University (1976); LL.M. (With Highest Honors), George Washington University (1978); 
Cutting Fellow and J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University (1980-1981). © Copyright retain-
ed by the author. 
1. Gray, The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?, 56 FOR. AFF. 771, 780 (1978) 
notes the increasing significance of technology in the development of space-based laser 
ballistic missile defense. 
2. See Gelber, SALT and the Strategic Future, 22 ORBIS 283, 288-291 (1978). 
3. A temporary strategic advantage may also result. See generally Evensen, Pres-
ent Military Uses of the Seabed and Foreseeable Developments, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121 
(1970). 
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type of conflict which have grown in response to the uncertainty. 
The superpowers may become less circumspect in their interna-
tional political dealings if technology manages to shift the locus of 
strategic conflict to areas where thermonuclear war may be 
fought with only a modicum of personal and physical destruction. 
The end result could be an increase in the incidence of superpower 
confrontation and, thus, an increase in the likelihood of thermo-
nuclear conflagration. 
For those who keep abreast of militarily useful technological 
developments, as well as the evolution of strategic thinking, it will 
come as no surprise that there is already a discernible trend 
toward the militarization of both outer space and the oceans. In 
fact, for some time now the United States and the Soviet Union 
have been striving to perfect anti-satellite weapons (ASA T)4 and 
improved devices for strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW).5 
Reportedly, the Soviet Union also continues to work toward de-
veloping an operational charged particle beam weapon6 which, con-
ceivably, could be based on earth and utilized to destroy incoming 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or stationed in outer 
space and directed against targets on earth or objects in outer 
space. 
It seems certain that interest in these and other weapons sys-
tems designed for use in transnational spatial areas will intensify 
given the fact that the theoretical rationale which, to some degree, 
serves to stimulate strategic planning and militarily useful tech-
nological development has evolved from massive retaliation,7 to 
mutual assured destruction,8 and, presently, is moving in the 
4. See Zedalis and Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 
1967, 8 CAL. w. INT'L L.J. 454 (1978). 
5. See Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Developing International Law 
of the Sea: An Analysis in the Context of Peacetime ASW, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (1979). 
6. See Robinson, Soviets Push for Beam Weapon, 106 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 16 
(May 2, 1977). 
7. This doctrine, formulated in the years immediately following the Second World 
War, was an articulation of the position of the U.S. that any threat to the stability of the 
Western Alliance System would result in immediate and complete extirpation of the Com-
munist Bloc. 
8. This doctrine developed in the late 1960's and 1970's following the precipitous 
growth of Soviet nuclear weaponry. The theory provides that nuclear conflict can be de-
terred by assuring potential opponents that any nuclear attack will be met with retaliation 
in kind. The objective is to hold the urban/industrial centers of the respective combatants 
hostage. 
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direction of counterforce capability .9 With each previous stage of 
the doctrinal ontogeny, theorists have actuated demands for ad-
vanced weapons systems in the expectation that these systems 
would further deter strategic conflict. But, given the fact that 
deterrence is largely a product of the apprehension of destructive 
retaliation, should the acquisition of a counterforce capability lead 
to further militarization of transnational spatial areas, deterrence 
could be lost. The chances of conflict may increase since such mili-
tarization might well shift the locus of strategic conflict, thereby 
largely insulating urban/industrial centers from the direct impact 
of thermonuclear war. This would indeed be an ironic outcome to 
the evolutionary development of strategic doctrine. 
In view of the short term and the long term international in-
stability which may be generated by the militarization of outer 
space, the polar zones, or the oceans, it is imperative that the pre-
scriptions of international law affecting military utilization of such 
areas be thoroughly examined in order to determine if adequate 
and effective restrictions or limitations on such activities exist. 
This study will initiate and hopefully stimulate continuing interest 
in such an examination by scrutinizing the international legal pre-
scriptions which affect various military uses of the high seas. 
Though brief reference will be made to those international conven-
tions which regulate most offensive and defensive strategic 
nuclear uses of the oceans, the specific objective of this study is to 
analyze the principles enunciated in both the 1958 High Seas Con-
vention 10 and Parts VII and XI of the Revised Composite N egoti-
ating Text (RCNT), 11 produced at the eighth session of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
in order to determine the extent to which the provisions of the 
RCNT, including those provisions which reserve the high seas to 
9. This doctrine has been undergoing development since the advent of relative 
nuclear parity and "essential equivalence" between the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. In general, the doctrine reflects the need to secure both the capability to 
absorb an initial nuclear strike and emerge with enough weapons to credibly threaten to 
destroy the opponents military, civilian, and industrial complex with a responsive strike 
unless capitulation is forthcoming, as well as the capability to launch an initial strike which 
eliminates the opponent's ability to meaningfully respond. See Wilson, "Counterforce" 
Arms Attract US., Soviets, WASH. POST, June 1, 1979, at A-1, col. 6. 
10. The Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 
5200, 450 U .N .T .S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as 1958 High Seas Conven-
tion]. 
11. U.N. DOC. A/CONF.62/WP.10/REv.l, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 686 
(1979). 
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use for "peaceful purposes," limit or proscribe military uses of the 
water surface, the navigable water column, the bed, and the sub-
soil of the high seas, not limited or proscribed by the 1958 Conven-
tion or any other international convention. 
IL MILITARY USES OF THE HIGH SEAS 
Before proceeding to discuss the applicable principles con-
tained in the 1958 High Seas Convention, and noting in detail any 
possible changes to be made in the regime articulated in that Con-
vention by the provisions of Parts VII and XI of the RCNT, it may 
prove beneficial, for purposes of analytical context, to describe 
generally and without regard to the limitations of international 
law, some of the possible military uses of the water surface, the 
navigable water column, the bed, and the subsoil of the high seas. 
Basically, all such military uses of the high seas fall into four gen-
eral categories: 1) navigation or some other conceptually related, 
yet functionally distinct, use of the water surface or navigable 
water column; 2) deployment of seabased missiles for offensive or 
defensive strategic purposes; 3) deployment of seabed based sur-
veillance devices and weapons systems for both strategic and tac-
tical purposes; and, 4) various types of military research, including 
that dealing with the testing of weapons. 
Navigational and related uses of the water surface and water 
column are perhaps the most typical and prevalent of all naval 
military activities on the high seas. In essence, such activities are 
performed as part of everyday naval operations or periodic condi-
tioning maneuvers. The activities include transiting of surface 
ships and submarines as well as various anti-ship exercises, 12 con-
ducted on the water surface, and ASW exercises, 13 conducted 
below the water surface in the navigable water column. Most 
operational and maneuver activities are designed to effectuate one 
of the traditional missions of sea control, 14 projection of power 
ashore, 15 or naval presence.16 Generally speaking, while the projec-
12. See generally Turner, The Naval Balance: Not Just A Numbers Game, 55 FOR. 
AFF. 339 (1977). 
13. Id. 
14. The traditional missions of sea control include the capacity to assert one's own use 
of the seas and to deny that use to others. Id. at 342. 
15. The projection of power ashore includes the ability to threaten and strike effec-
tively military targets along the littoral of the enemy or deep inside its territory. See 
Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, 26 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 2, 8 (1974). 
16. Naval presence includes the orchestrated, non-combat use of seapower to secure 
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tion of power ashore and the naval presence missions are per-
formed by nuclear and conventional powered aircraft carriers, as 
well as cruisers and destroyers armed with ship-to-ship and ship-
to-shore missiles, the assertion and denial aspects of the sea con-
trol mission are performed by submarines, aircraft, or ships 
capable of launching missiles, and attack submarines capable of 
launching torpedoes. 
In addition to sea control, projection of power ashore, and 
naval presence, the fourth traditional naval mission is strategic 
deterrence. This fourth mission is presently fulfilled by Polaris/ 
Poseidon missile launching nuclear submarines (SSBNs). However, 
seabased offensive strategic missile deployment will undoubtedly 
increase in the upcoming decades. Evidence of this can be seen in 
the fact that the vulnerability of the U.S. land based intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile (ICBM) system11 has stimulated some strategic 
theorists to suggest that the soon to be developed MX missile be 
deployed in pairs aboard several hundred conventionally powered 
submarines which would constantly navigate in the water column 
within two-hundred miles of the U.S. littoral. 18 This mode of de-
ployment, however, has apparently not received serious considera-
tion.19 Another possible deployment scenario might involve placing 
ICBMs on stationary launching pads fixed to the ocean floor or on 
huge mobile track platforms capable of moving along the ocean 
an international political objective. See generally E. LUTTWAK, THE POLITICAL USES OF SEA 
POWER 1-38 (1974). 
17. For the seminal writing on this matter, see N itze, Assuring Strategic Stability in 
an Era of Detente, 54 FOR. AFF. 207 (1976). 
18. See Greenberg, Missiles at Sea, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1979, at A-19, col. 2. 
19. Gray, supra note 1, at 785 notes three of the four multiple aim point (MAP) deploy-
ment modes given serious consideration. The ones listed include: 13-20 mile long buried 
trenches; dispersed and hardened horizontal or vertical shelters; and, deployment in pools 
of water. The fourth major mode is on strategic aircraft. Early reports indicated that the 
Administration favored the former mode of deployment. See Zelnick, Paul Nitze: The 
Nemesis of SALT II, WASH. POST, June 24, 1979, at G-1, G-4, col. 6. Some suggest the dis-
persed vertical shelter mode of deployment was abandoned because of Soviet insistence 
that it would violate the new SALT II accord. See Evans and Novak, MX: Son of B-1?, 
WASH. POST, ,June 18, 1979, at A-23, col. 5. Notwithstanding this, recent reports indicate 
that at the writing of this article (Fall 1979) the Administration has adopted a synthesis of 
the buried trench and vertical/horizontal shelter schemes. See Walsh, Carter to Deploy MX 
in Utah, Nevada, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1979, at A-1, col. 3. This would involve some 200 oval 
shaped roadways, each having 23 spur roads leading to buried launching platforms. One MX 
stationed at each of the 200 roadways would be shuttled between each of the 23 launching 
platforms. See Kaiser, Complicated "Race Track" Scheme Favored for Basing New MX 
Missile, WASH. POST, July 26, 1979, at A-3, col. 1. 
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floor from one location to another.20 
The increasing vulnerability of ICBMs and intercontinental 
bombers has also rekindled interest in ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) systems.21 In the next few decades there may be significant 
pressures to develop additional effective systems capable of inter-
cepting incoming ICBMs. 22 If this happens, there may very well be 
an effort to take advantage of the natural benefits of a seabased 
strategic defensive missile system.23 In short, a BMD system em-
ploying seabased weapons stationed aboard surface ships, sub-
marines, or on submerged stationary or mobile launching plat-
forms, would appear to provide the advantages of mobility and/or 
concealment, and, upon the defensive missile's impact with an in-
coming ICBM, interdiction at a spatial point above the ocean 
rather than above inhabited territory. 
The third general category of high seas military activity in-
volves the deployment of seabed based surveillance devices and 
weapons systems for both strategic and tactical purposes. While 
most of the seabed based surveillance devices presently deployed 
by the U.S. Navy are located along the Atlantic, Pacific, or Gulf 
coasts of the United States,24 the coasts of certain allies,25 or at 
various strategically located ocean choke points,26 efforts have 
been made to obtain a much more ambitious long-range high seas 
detection capability.27 In fact, within the past decade serious con-
20. This method was viewed as a possibility in Gehring, Legal Rules Affecting Mili-
tary Uses of the Seabed, 54 MIL. L. REV. 168, 177 (1971). 
21. See Foreign Aff. and Nat. Defense Div., Cong. Research Service, Library of Cong., 
EVALUATION OF FISCAL YEAR 1979 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT: TOWARD MORE IN-
FORMED CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING 83 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as ACIS]. 
22. See Wilson, Air Force Suggests Reviving ABM to Protect MX, WASH. POST, Aug. 
7, 1979, at A-11, col. 1. 
23. See Gehring, supra note 20, at 177. 
24. The portion of the fixed acoustic detection array system, also known as Sonar 
Surveillance System (SOSUS), deployed along the East Coast is named "Caesar"; that on 
the West Coast is named "Colossus." A similar network is deployed in the Gulf. See K. 
TSIPIS, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE w ARFARE 80 (Appendix l, Table l, A(5)) 
(1974). 
25. This system is known as "Barrier" and "Bronco." Id. 
26. These passages are located between Bear Island and the northern shore of Nor-
way; Greenland, Iceland, and the southwestern shore of Spain; Newfoundland, the Azores, 
and the southwestern shore of Spain; in the English Channel and around Gibraltar; near 
Italy and Turkey; and between Japan and Korea. See ACIS supra note 21, at 110. 
27. One system, "Sea Spider," is a passive acoustic submarine detection unit com-
posed of a single hydrophonic listening device three meters in diameter and anchored by 
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sideration was given, and one day may be given again, to a plan to 
augment the existing short-range fixed acoustic detection array 
system by deploying several active28 detection devices of massive 
size. Collectively, the network was to be known as the Suspended 
Array System (SAS).29 At the time of consideration, it was antici-
pated that one such device placed in each ocean would insonify all 
of the ocean space. If such a detection, identification, and localiza-
tion system were functionally integrated with an effective 
weapons system capable of rapidly attriting enemy submarines, 
the invulnerability of the SSBN would be greatly jeopardized. 
The most important seabed based weapons presently utilized 
are the physical contact, depression, and magnetic/acoustic mines. 
The physical contact mine is designed to be free floating, as well 
as moored, and explodes upon impact. Both the depression and the 
magnetic/acoustic mine, on the other hand, are moored to the 
ocean floor and are detonated by certain vicissitudes in the im-
mediately surrounding water column. Augmenting these tradi-
tional weapons is the Captor anti-submarine mine, the latest and 
most effective addition to the seabed based weapons system. 30 
Essentially, Captor consists of a submersible mine moored to the 
ocean floor. The mine itself contains a releaseable torpedo with an 
active and/or passive homing device possessing a target acquisi-
tion radius of approximately one kilometer.31 Consequently, Cap-
tor is an effective weapon against all deep diving submarines32 
three cables at a depth of about 5000 meters. The unit is reported to be nuclear powered 
and stationed a few hundred miles north of Hawaii. See K. TsrPIS, supra note 24, at 80. 
Another network, "Moored Surveillance System" (MSS), consists of command activated, 
long life sonobuoys dropped from the air which automatically moor to the ocean floor. Such 
sonobuoys may be moored in up to 3,000 fathoms of water and function for up to 90 days. 
See K. TSIPIS, supra note 24, 30, 80 (Appendix l, Table l, A(5)). 
28. An active acoustic detection device consists of both electromechanical trans-
ducers, designed to convert electrical energy into acoustic energy which is then propagated 
through ocean space, and hyper-sensitive hydrophones or listening instruments that detect 
the sound emissions reflected from the transiting vessels. Passive acoustic detection 
devices, on the other hand, consist of nothing more than hydrophones. Due to certain 
natural impediments, the active device has a much more attenuated range than the passive 
device. See generally Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst., Antisubmarine Warfare in 
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, SIPRI YEARBOOK 1974, 303-309 (1974). 
29. See id. at 317. The active acoustic detection device was to sit on a giant tripod 
resting on the ocean floor at a depth of close to 5,000 meters. Each leg of the tripod was said 
to be ten kilometers apart. 
30. See ACIS supra note 21, at 108. 
31. K. TSIPIS, supra note 24, at 33. 
32. Zedalis, supra note 5, at 591. 
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and, when coupled with the previously mentioned detection de-
vices, could conceivably treaten the survival capability of some 
SSBNs. 
The final major military use of the high seas which should be 
mentioned involves various types of research activity, including 
weapons testing, conducted either on the water surface, in the 
navigable water column, or the subjacent seabed and subsoil. It 
should be noted that the relative difficulty of conducting pro-
longed stationary subsurface activity at significant depths may 
well induce nations to initially utilize the submerged oceanic 
mountain plateaus, known as guyots, rather than refrain from 
such activity pending the resolution of technical and physiological 
problems endemic to man's use of the deep ocean environment. 
However, as military oceanography matures, we should witness a 
gradual movement of such stationary seabed activity from the 
guyots to the most perilous depths of the high seas. 
A large portion of the present high seas military research is 
conducted from submersible vehicles, many of which are capable 
of both column navigation and bottom crawling. It may not be 
long, however, before such research is also conducted from large 
permanent aquahabitats, stationed on the ocean floor, which may 
eventually serve as underwater submarine depots. This could be a 
significant development in that it would probably increase the 
period of time all submersible vessels, including submarines, could 
engage in operational exercises without returning to home port. In 
addition to such uses, the underwater research stations could, in 
the future, prove to be a prime location for the testing of naval ord-
nance, including nuclear devices implanted on or below the bed 
of the high seas. 
III. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING MILITARY USES 
OF THE HIGH SEAS 
Many of the more significant military uses of the high seas 
mentioned in Section II are regulated by various international con-
ventions which affect, inter alia, offensive and defensive strategic 
nuclear uses of the oceans. Specifically, the Seabed Arms Control 
Treaty of 1972 (SACT)33 prohibits, and the recently negotiated 
33. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (effective May 18, 1972). 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1979 (SALT II)34 proposes to 
prohibit, respectively, the emplacement of stationary nuclear 
weapons or missiles on the ocean floor further than twelve miles 
from the coastline of the deploying state, and the development, 
testing, or deployment of stationary or mobile strategic nuclear 
missiles designed to be placed on, or able to move in contact with, 
any part of the ocean floor, including that portion subjacent to in-
ternal waters. These proscriptions are supplemented by the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (LTB),35 which prohibits the test-
ing of nuclear weapons on or beneath the surface of territorial 
waters or the high seas, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972 (ABM),36 which prohibits the development, testing, or deploy-
ment of any seabased BMD system. At the present time, all other 
nuclear or conventional peacetime military uses of the high seas 
are governed only by the principles enunciated in the 1958 High 
Seas Convention. 
In the balance of this study, attention is devoted to analyzing 
certain apposite principles articulated in the 1958 Convention and 
Parts VII and XI of the RCNT. The objective of this analysis is to 
determine the extent to which the legal regime proposed by the 
provisions of Parts VII and XI of the RCNT, including the provi-
sions which reserve the high seas to use for "peaceful purposes," 
differs from the regime established by the 1958 Convention in that 
it will affect significant military uses of the high seas which are 
not now proscribed by the SACT, SALT II, the LTB, or the ABM 
Treaty, or in any way regulated effectively by the 1958 Conven-
tion. The analysis has particular relevance given the fact that 
34. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed June 18, 1979, Selected 
Documents No. 12A, 26, 41 (Bureau of Public Affairs, Dep't of State). Article IX provides: 
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy: 
(b) Fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean 
floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the 
subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact 
with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, 
or missiles for such launchers; .... 
35. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effec-
tive Oct. 10, 1963). 
36. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, done May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (effective Oct. 3, 1962). 
37. The 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 10. 
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sonic detection devices and weapons capable of locating, identify-
ing, and destroying SSBNs, the most secure component of the stra-
tegic triad, can be deployed in the waters or on the bed of the high 
seas. If the RCNT establishes a regime which does not proscribe 
activity which may jeopardize the SSBN, serious consideration 
should be given to negotiating amendments to the draft text or, if 
this is impossible, to undertaking an effort to have the objec-
tionable part of the text rejected. Conversely, if the regime enun-
ciated in the RCNT enhances the invulnerability of the SSBN by 
regulating activities which may either threaten the balance of 
strategic forces or shift the locus of strategic conflict, then con-
sideration should be given to embracing the draft text. The analy-
sis which follows will focus initially on both the provisions of the 
1958 Convention and the provisions of the RCNT which are appli-
cable to the water surface and the navigable water column of the 
high seas and, thereafter, upon the provisions of each respective 
document applicable to the bed and subsoil of the high seas. 
A. The Waters of the High Seas 
Pursuant to the regime established by the four 1958 Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the internal waters of a 
coastal state are located landward of the baseline. Extending from 
the baseline seaward, perhaps as much as twelve miles, is the ter-
ritorial sea. Article 1 of the 1958 High Seas Convention,37 desig-
nates all waters beyond the outer perimeter of the territorial sea 
as high seas.38 The RCNT, however, uses a different locational 
38. Article 1 reads, id., at 2314: "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that 
are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." The International 
Law Commission's (ILC) draft article 26, initially considered by Committee II (High Seas) of 
the 1958 Conference, read, Report of the Int'l L. Comrri'n to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. 
GAOR, SUPP. (No. 9) 7, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted (1956) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 
CoMM'N 253, 259, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1956 ILC 
Report]: "1. The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the terri-
torial sea, as contemplated by Part I, or in the internal waters of a State. 2. Waters within 
the baseline of the territorial sea are considered 'internal waters.'" When Committee II of 
the 1958 Conference considered the ILC draft article 26, proposals were made by France, 4 
U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 116, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.6 & Corr.1 (1958); Romania and 
the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 123, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/L.26 (1958); U.K. and Northern Ireland, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 38, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.47 (1958); and Brazil, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 133, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/L.67 (1958). The Committee adopted the proposal of France to delete para-
graph 2 of the ILC draft article 26 and, on proposal of Greece, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.13/C.2/ 
L.54 (1958), referred paragraph 2 to Committee II (52 to 0, with 2 abstentions). The Plenary 
meetings of the Conference amended the Committee II draft so as to read like article 1 of 
the 1958 High Seas Convention. 
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definition. Specifically, article 86 of the draft convention defines 
the high seas as that body of water situated beyond an imaginary 
delineation two hundred miles from the baseline. Intervening be-
tween the outer boundary of the territorial sea and the landward 
boundary of the high seas is the economic zone, an area within 
which the coastal state has numerous exclusive economic inter-
ests.39 
1. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF THE 1958 HIGH SEAS CONVENTION 
The nature of the legal regime presently governing the 
waters beyond the territorial sea is articulated in article 2 of the 
1958 High Seas Convention. Article 2 provides: 
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom 
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by 
these articles and by other rules of international law. It com-
prises, inter alia, ... : 
(1) Freedom of navigation; 
(2) Freedom of fishing; 
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. 
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the 
general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all 
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in 
their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas.40 
In general, the language of article 2 denies validity to any ef-
fort by any nation to subject a portion of the high seas to its 
sovereignty41 and declares the entire area open to use by all 
39. Article 86, RCNT, supra note 11, at 726 reads: 
The provisions of this Part [Part VII, High Seas] apply to all parts of the sea 
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, ... . This article does not entail any abridgement of the 
freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with 
article 58. 
40. Article 2, 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 10, at 2314. The final draft is 
identical to that reported out of Committee II. See 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 150-151, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.17/Add.1/Corr.1 (1958). Article 27, 1956 ILC Report, supra note 
38, at 259, stated simply: "The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly pur-
port to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas comprises, 
inter alia: (1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom to lay submarine 
cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas." 
41. In reference to the proscription of any state subjecting the high seas to its sover-
eignty, the ILC said, 1956 ILC Report, supra note 38, at 278, commentary 1 to article 27: 
11
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states.'2 Specifically, article 2 entitles all states to exercise on the 
high seas the freedoms of navigation,43 overflight, fishing, laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and any other freedoms recog-
nized by the general principles of international law.44 The exercise 
of such freedoms, however, must be undertaken with reasonable 
regard for the exercise by other states of the freedoms similarly 
assured them. 45 
The most widely acknowledged unstated use of the high seas 
presently recognized by the general principles of international law 
is the right of all states to employ the high seas for military pur·· 
poses. Military vessels are undoubtedly entitled to traverse the 
waters of the high seas pursuant to the freedom of navigation. The 
extent to which other military uses are permitted though is not 
made altogether clear by the Convention. In order to explicate the 
general nature of other permissible military uses, it may prove 
profitable to examine briefly two proposals submitted during the 
1958 Geneva Conference for the purpose of restricting both mili-
tary maneuvers and nuclear weapons tests conducted on the high 
seas.46 
"No State may subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; hence no State may ex-
ercise jurisdiction over any stretch of waters" (emphasis added). Compare this with the 
more extensive statement of Mr. Colglough (U.S.A.) that the proscription meant that the 
"high seas were the property not of one nation, or of a few nations, but of the community of 
nations- he said that the high seas were not open to regulation or appropriation by any one 
nation or group of nations" (emphasis added). See 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 37, para. 4. 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.15 (1958). The notion of regulation is quite similar to the ILC's 
idea of jurisdiction. However, appropriation would seem to include most exclusive uses. Yet 
such uses have traditionally been viewed as consistent with the notion that the high seas 
may not be subjected to the sovereignty of one or a group of states. 
42. As initially articulated by Hugo Grotius, the principle of mare liberum was said to 
rest on three bases. First, it was said that the vast areas encompassed made it impossible 
for any one nation to occupy the high seas. Second, the resources were said to be inexhausti-
ble and thus there was no need to permit individual states to reduce the area to possession 
to prevent dispute. And finally, it was said that the readily accessible transportation lanes 
provided by the sea facilitated important inter-cultural exchanges. See H. GROTIUS, MARE 
LIBERUM 7-10, 22-44 (rev. ed. 1916). It seems that only the latter has endured the three-
hundred and fifty years since Grotius produced his seminal work. 
43. The freedom of navigation has historically been the most important inclusive use. 
See M. McDOUGAL and w. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 765-773 (1962). For case 
support, see Le Louis, 2 Dodson 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817), and The Marianna Flora, 24 
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826). 
44. Article 27 of the 1956 ILC draft also contained "inter alia" language. Commentary 
2 of article 27, 1956 ILC Report, supra note 38, at 278 states: "The list of freedoms of the 
high seas contained in this article is not restrictive. The Commission has merely specified 
four of the main freedoms, but is aware that there are other freedoms .... " 
45. See M. McDOUGAL and W. BURKE, supra note 43, at 772. 
46. Both proposals were prompted somewhat by the commentary on article 27 of the 
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The first, known as the Three Power Proposal, grew out of 
the fact that major military powers found it essential to use por-
tions of the high seas for conducting military maneuvers and tar-
get practice. Though such use resulted, of necessity, in the exclu-
sion of simultaneous use by other states,47 the nations conducting 
the maneuvers were, for the most part, reluctant to actually 
assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals within the maneuver 
zones or forcibly attempt to prevent such nationals from entering 
the areas of use.48 This was undoubtedly the result of their realiza-
tion that to do so would have constituted an effort to subject the 
area of use to sovereignty and would thereby have run afoul of the 
proscription stated in article 2 of the Convention. Despite this re-
luctance, the nature of the maneuvers did in fact result in the 
zones actually being put to extensive, long term, exclusive use.49 
1956 ILC draft. Paragraph 1, sentence 3, of the commentary states that in exercising any 
high seas freedom a nation must refrain from any activity which might "adversely affect" 
the use of the high seas by nationals of another state. See commentary to article 27, 1956 
ILC Report, supra note 38, at 278. 
47. Mr. Colglough (U.S.A.) perspecaciously noted, 4 U.N . Conf. Law of the Sea 15, 
para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.9 (1958), that any time state X exercises a freedom 
over spot l, it is impossible for the use not to "adversely affect" the use of the same spot 1 
by state Y. He said: 
It could not be held that the use of the high seas was invalid solely because some 
inconvenience would result for other users. Any use of the high seas by one state 
temporarily [denies] to other states some degree of ability to use the seas, just as 
the use of a road by a motor-car to some extent [restricts] its use by others. 
48. See Legality of Using the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear Weapons Tests 
in the Pacific Ocean, U.S. Delegation Paper, U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea, 1958, US/CLS/Pos/ 
48 (2)-(3), Annex II, Feb. 20, 1958, cited in 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
546, 549 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Delegation Paper]. See also M. McDOUGAL and W. 
BURKE, supra note 43, at 769-770. 
49. See Delegation Paper, supra note 48, at 549, where it is said: 
Apparently there has been no essential change in attitude in recent years 
even though rather substantial portions of in~ernational space [high seas] are being 
utilized as military aircraft target and maneuver ranges for relatively long periods 
of time. There are today numerous United States military aircraft practice zones 
over international waters in the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific areas .... 
The British have similar military aircraft practice zones over portions of in-
ternational waters near the British Isles. These are in such regular use the com-
mercial aircraft must regularly detour them on flights to and from the continent 
(emphasis added). 
The British practice should be noted carefully. The effect of regular use is to apparently ex-
clude use by others on a permanent basis. However, this use alone, when unaccompanied by 
a claim to sovereignty or any active effort to preclude others from entering the area of use, 
was not perceived as an effort to subject the area to sovereignty, and, thus violative of free-
dom of the seas. Rather, since the use was intimately related with "national security," it 
was seen as a valued and reasonable use of the high seas. 
13
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At the 1958 Geneva Conference, several nations protested 
such use of the high seas.50 Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet 
Union actually sponsored a proposal designed to prohibit such ac-
tivities. The proposal would have provided that "[n]o naval or air 
ranges or other combat training areas limiting freedom of naviga-
tion may be designated on the high seas near foreign coasts or on 
international sea routes."51 Although not comprehensive,52 such 
language would have eliminated extensive, long term use of the 
high seas for maneuvers or target practice. The Conference dele-
gates decisively rejected the Three Power Proposal.53 In doing so 
they apparently acknowledged that naval maneuvers and target 
practice, though extensive and exclusive uses, were not violative 
of the international law of the seas. 
The Eastern Bloc did not capitulate following the defeat of 
the Three Power Proposal.54 Rather, it emerged more determined 
than ever to eliminate nuclear test detonations on the high seas.55 
To accomplish this objective, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, 
50. At the 1958 Conference the Soviet Union, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 10, para. 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.7 (1958), Romania, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 16, para. 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.9 (1958), and Bulgaria, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 19, para. 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.10 (1958), all expressed this view. 
51. The Three Power Proposal, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 124, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/L.32 (1958), was to be appended to the 1956 ILC draft article 27, supra note 
40. The proposal was rejected 43 to 13, with 9 abstentions, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 54, 
para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.21 (1958). 
52. It should be noted that this was not a blanket proposal. It was designed to pro-
scribe only extensive activities near coasts or international sealanes. See remarks by Mr. 
Raduilsky (Bulgaria), 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 41, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/ 
SR.16 (1958), in reference to the Three Power Proposal (Albania, Bulgaria, and U.S.S.R.) to 
ban military maneuvers. He stated it "did not refer to areas of the high seas used for ordi-
nary naval or air exercises of short duration. It was rather designed to establish interna-
tional standards forbidding the designation of naval and air training areas for long periods 
on a unilateral basis." 
53. Three Power Proposal, supra note 51, was rejected 43 to 13, with 9 abstentions. 
54. Several delegates spoke against the legality of nuclear tests. Mr. Bierzanek 
(Poland) stated such tests created a "de facto sovereignty," 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 6-7, 
para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.6 (1958); Mr. Tunkin (U.S.S.R.) said they violated 
paragraph 1 of the commentary to the ILC's draft article 27, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 
9-10, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.7 (1958); Ohye (Japan) expressed agreement 
with Tunkin's position in relation to article 27, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 11, para. 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.8 (1958); Mr. Ghelmegeanu (Romania) felt the tests "interfered" 
with other uses, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 16, para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.9 
(1958); Mr. Zourek (Czechoslovakia) concurred with Tunkin's position, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of 
the Sea 24, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.11 (1958). 
55. Such test detonations were later eliminated by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 
1963, supra note 35. 
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and the Soviet Union submitted what has come to be known as the 
Four Power Proposal. In short, the proposal was designed to pro-
hibit all states from testing nuclear weapons on the high seas.56 In 
response, several delegates insisted that since the question of ban-
ning test explosions was intimately related to the whole disarma-
ment issue, consideration of such a proposal was beyond the baili-
wick of the Conference.57 Others, however, felt that since nuclear 
testing constituted use of the high seas, the Conference was 
authorized to consider the problem as part of the discussion on 
freedom of the seas.58 The Four Power Proposal was ultimately 
countered with a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom.59 
·The United Kingdom Proposal was later withdrawn, after lengthy 
debate, in favor of a compromise solution proffered by India to 
send the entire matter of nuclear weapons tests to the United Na-
tions General Assembly .60 The Indian compromise was adopted 
and the proposal to ban nuclear test detonations was never sub-
jected to a vote.61 
After the rejection of the Three Power Proposal and the ex-
pedient Indian compromise solution to the problem created by the 
56. The Four Power Proposal was designed to insert the following after the 1956 ILC 
draft article 27: "States are bound to refrain from testing nuclear weapons on the high 
seas." See 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 124, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.30 (1958). 
57. See remarks of Mr. Weeks (Liberia), 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 21-22, para. 28, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.10 (1958), Mr. Colglough (U.S.A.), 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 
15, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.9 (1958), Mr. Randall (U.K.), 4 U.N. Conf. Law of 
the Sea 13, para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.8 (1958). 
58. Mr. Sikri (India), 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 12, para. 12, U.N. Doc. 
A/CO NF .13/C.2/SR.8 (1958). 
59. 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 132, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.64 (1958). 
60. U.K. proposal was withdrawn at the 18th meeting of Committee II, 4 U.N. Conf. 
Law of the Sea 47, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.18 (1958). The Indian Proposal, 4 
U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 134, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.71/Rev.1 (1958), stated: 
Recalling that the Conference has been convened by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 1105 (XI) of 21 February 1957, 
and 
Recognizing that there is a serious and genuine apprehension on the part of 
many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of the freedom of 
the seas, and 
Recognizing that the question . . . is still under review by the General 
Assembly ... and by the Disarmament Commission ... 
Decides to refer this matter to the General Assembly for appropriate action. 
61. The Indian proposal was adopted 51to1, with 14 abstentions, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of 
the Sea 52, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.20 (1958). On the general debate as to the 
legality of nuclear weapons tests, see Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and In-
ternational Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955); McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests 
in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955). 
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Four Power Proposal, the delegates at the 1958 Geneva Confer-
ence immediately proceeded to adopt a joint proposal advanced by 
the United Kingdom and Ireland subjecting each permissible use 
of the high seas to the condition, mentioned earlier, that the use 
be undertaken with reasonable regard for the exercise by other 
states of the freedoms guaranteed them.62 The adoption by the 
Conference of the proposal submitted by the United Kingdom and 
Ireland silenced those nations which maintained that international 
law did not countenance military uses of the high seas which are 
either lengthy in duration, yet spatially circumscribed (i.e., maneu-
vers), or short in duration, but encompassing vast geographical 
areas (i.e., nuclear tests). This is reflected in the present language 
of article 2 which essentially provides that any military use of the 
high seas is permissible as long as it is reasonable. Though every 
use inevitably precludes some other state from undertaking a 
simultaneous use of the same area, such use is not ipso facto un-
reasonable or in contravention of the provision proscribing subjec-
tion of the high seas to state sovereignty. If the benefits derived 
from the particular exclusive military use outweigh the incon-
venience caused to inclusive areas of the seas,63 and the utilizing 
state refrains from either exercising jurisdiction over foreign na-
tionals within the area or preventing them from traversing the 
area, then the activity comports with article 2 of the Convention. 
2. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF PART VII OF THE RCNT 
It should be noted at the outset that the regime established 
62. The proposal of the United Kingdom, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 134, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/L.68 (1958), was adopted 30 to 18, with 9 abstentions. It appended the 
following to article 27 of the ILC draft, supra note 38: "These freedoms, and others which 
are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States 
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of 
the high seas." Also appended to article 27 was a proposal submitted by Mexico, 4 U.N. 
Conf. Law of the Sea 115, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.3 (1958). Article 27, as amended by 
the U .K. and Mexican proposals, was adopted by Committee II, 50 to 4, with 12 abstentions, 
4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 56, para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.22 (1958), and ap-
proved at the Plenary meetings 51 to 0, with 1 abstention, 2 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 20, 
para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.10 (1958). 
63. See M. McDOUGAL and W. BURKE, supra note 43, at 772 where it is stated: 
Fair assessment of the relevant factors would indicate to the impartial observer 
that the exclusive use attendant upon weapons testing fully comports with the 
reasonableness criterion .... 
In contrast to [the] minimal effects upon inclusive use, the interest at stake for the 
United States is easily seen to be of the greatest significance for its security and 
for that of a good part of the world. 
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by the 1958 Convention and that contained in Part VII of the 
RCNT are quite similar. In fact, following the pattern of article 2 
of the 1958 Convention, article 87 of the RCNT states in part: 
1. The high seas are open to all States, .... Freedom of the 
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this 
Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, 
inter alia, ... : 
(a) Freedom of navigation; 
(b) Freedom of overflight; 
(c) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, ... ; 
(d) . Freedom to construct artificial islands and other in-
stallations permitted under international law, ... ; 
(e) Freedom of fishing, ... ; 
(f) Freedom of scientific research, .... 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States, with due 
consideration for the interests of other States in their exercise 
of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due consideration 
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in 
the Area.63A 
Following the enumeration in article 87 of the rights which all 
states are entitled to exercise, article 89 declares the invalidity of 
an attempt by any nation to subject a portion of the high seas to 
its sovereignty .64 
In addition to the freedoms specified in article 2 of the 1958 
Convention, article 87 of the RCNT provides that every state is 
entitled to conduct scientific research65 and construct installations 
for the exploration and exploitation of that portion of its continental 
shelf extending beyond the economic zone.66 Furthermore, although 
article 87 of the RCNT67 does not contain language incorporating 
other unstated freedoms recognized by the general principles of 
international law, the fact that the recitation of express freedoms 
is prefaced by the words "inter alia" accomplishes the same 
result. The exercise of any of the freedoms, express or implied, is 
irrefutably subject to the condition that such be undertaken with 
"due consideration" for the interests of other states.68 
63.A Article 87, RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
64. Article 89, RCNT, supra note 11, at 727 states: "No State may validly purport to 
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty." 
65. Article 87(1)(f), RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
66. Article 87(1)(d), RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
67. See article 87(1), RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
68. The language used in the 1958 text states "reasonable regard." This specific lan-
guage was contained in a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom, supra note 62, 
17
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Perhaps the most conspicuous addition made by Part VII of 
the RCNT to the legal regime established by the 1958 Convention 
is the reservation of the high seas to use for "peaceful purposes." 
Article 88 of the RCNT69 states that the "[h]igh seas shall be re-
served for peaceful purposes." Though reservations of transna-
tional spatial areas for "peaceful purposes" is by no means a novel 
conception in international law,70 the ambiguity of the "peaceful 
purposes" provision has generated continuing debate as to the 
nature of the normative prescription it declares. Some suggest 
that the term "peaceful purposes" permits all nonaggressive uses, 
even though they may be of a military nature. Others insist that 
only non-military uses are consonant with the provision.71 In the 
context of the instant draft convention, if only non-military uses 
are permitted, then the high seas may not be employed for any ac-
tivity of a military nature, including the navigation of warships.12 
adopted in opposition to language used in sentence 3 of comment 1 to article 27 of the 1956 
ILC draft, which sought to prevent any use that might adversely affect use by nationals of 
another state. Pursuant to the "adversely affect" test, the Eastern Bloc powers objected to 
many uses which were exclusive in nature, and sought to proscribe both military maneuvers 
and nuclear weapons tests. "Due consideration" seems to require any using state to be 
cognizant of the interests of others in using the area and to abstain from non-essential exclu-
sive uses which substantially interfere with valued inclusive uses not really different from 
the 1958 Convention. 
69. Article 88, RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
70. "Peaceful purposes" is also used in article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. l, 
1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961); Article IV of 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space 
Treaty]; and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 
U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective July 29, 1957). 
71. For a non-military construction in refere~ce to the Outer Space Treaty, see 
Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in Interna-
tional Space Law, 1968 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 73 (1969). For a non-
aggressive interpretation, see Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space 
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COMM. 419 (1967). 
72. It should be noted that even the non-military definition of "peaceful purposes" 
does not prohibit military activities if undertaken as an exercise of the right of self-defense. 
This is so for several reasons. First, since the fundamental objective of the international law 
decision-making process is to peacefully resolve competing state claims, construing "peace-
ful purposes" to prohibit military activities undertaken as an exercise of self-defense would 
increase instability and violence because unscrupulous nations would seek to take advan-
tage of those observing the non-military prescription. Thus, this would essentially con-
travene the fundamental objective of the international law decision-making process. Second, 
self-defense is an "inherent" right which cannot be taken away absent the existence of some 
centralized decision-making body capable of replacing the present decentralized decision-
making process. Finally, the inherency of the right means that it need not be mentioned in 
every convention, lest its absence in a particular convention lead to assertions that it was 
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On the other hand, if "peaceful purposes" simply prescribes a non-
aggressive standard, then the high seas may legally be used for a 
whole host of activities of a military nature as long as none of the 
activities are aggressive. 
When the "peaceful purposes" provision of article 88 of the 
RCNT is construed in the context of the whole draft convention so 
as to effectuate the general intention of the architects as evi-
denced by the preceding and subsequent provisions,73 the inescap-
able conclusion is that it establishes a nonaggressive normative 
standard. One of the enumerated freedoms of the high seas guar-
anteed to all states is the freedom of navigation. This freedom is 
not restricted and in fact the RCNT contemplates navigation by 
military as well as civilian vessels.74 Such use, however, would be 
clearly inconsistent with a non-military standard.75 Military use of 
intended to be removed. In reference to the latter, see I FOR. REL. OF THE U.S. 1928, 36-37 
(1942), where it is said in respect to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty: 
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or im-
pairs in any way the right of self-defense. The right is inherent in every sovereign 
state and is implicit in every treaty .... 
Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the 
same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the identical 
question approached from the other side. Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add 
to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a treaty 
should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for the 
unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition. 
73. There are basically two schools of thought on the construction of treaties: the 
"plain meaning" school, and the "general purpose" school. The former uses as its primary 
operable premise the notion of univocalism, i.e., that every term has but one meaning, that 
the meaning is easily identifiable, and that the meaning controls. The preferable method of 
construction is the latter. It seeks to effectuate the true intentions of the drafters by con-
struing ambiguous provisions in the context of the total treaty. This approach is supported 
by article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 
May 23, 1969, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 885 (1969). For further support, see Judge Anzilotti's dis-
senting opinion in, Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concerning Employment of 
Women During the Night, P.C.l.J., ser. A!B No. 50 (1932). On the plain meaning rule, see 
Gross, Voting in the Security Council, 60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951). 
74. Article 95, RCNT, supra note 11, at 728 reads: "Warships on the high seas have 
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." The provi-
sion implicitly contemplates the use of the high seas by warships. Moreover, articles 29-32, 
RCNT, supra note 11, at 709, establish the rules for warships passing through the territorial 
sea of a coastal state. Since foreign warships most frequently reach the territorial sea of a 
coastal state by traversing a portion of the high seas, it seems that these articles also con-
template some use of the high seas by military vessels. 
75. The opposite, however, has been argued in relation to the Outer Space Treaty of 
1967. See Finch, Outer Space for ''Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A.J. 365 (1968). Many com-
mentators feel that the Outer Space Treaty language permitting the use of military person-
nel and equipment on the moon and other celestial bodies requires that "peaceful purposes" 
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the high seas is a well established customary utilization recog-
nized by the general principles of international law and incor-
porated in article 87 of the RCNT by virtue of the words "inter 
alia" prefacing the litany of express freedoms. To suggest that the 
"peaceful purposes" provision establishes a non-military standard 
is inconsistent with the language contemplating military naviga-
tion as well as that incorporating more extensive military uses. In 
light of the minimal interference caused to inclusive uses of ocean 
space by highly valued exclusive military uses, such a result 
seems desirable. 
In recapitulation, Part VII of the RCNT situates the point of 
origin of the high seas some two-hundred miles from the baseline. 
The legal regime enunciated in article 2 of the 1958 Convention to 
govern the general character of the high seas remains intact with 
the waters being both open to all and beyond the efforts of any na-
tion to subject them to sovereignty. The freedoms of the seas in-
clude those specifically enumerated in article 2 of the 1958 Con-
vention and a few additional ones endemic to the general legal 
regime proposed by the RCNT. In addition, while the language in 
article 2 of the 1958 Convention, subjecting the exercise of all free-
doms to the condition that the exercise be undertaken with "rea-
sonable regard" for the interests of others, has been changed to 
read with "due consideration" for the interests of others, the 
change is basically semantical. The inclusion of a provision in Part 
VII of the RCNT articulating that the high seas is reserved for 
"peaceful purposes" simply obligates all utilizing states to refrain 
from aggressive uses. 
be defined to prescribe a non-aggressive standard. In light of the fact that most if not all 
celestial exploration is undertaken by military personnel utilizing military equipment, it can 
be cogently argued that the drafters included such language so as to avert suggestions that 
a non-military definition of the "peaceful purposes" clause precluded military personnel 
from exploring outer space. Thus, it is very possible to have a non-military normative stan-
dard for outer space, yet in recognition of the realities, permit military personnel to explore 
space. After all, military equipment can be used for activities of a non-military nature. 
In relation to the RCNT, the same argument seems cauistric since it is not essential to 
use military personnel and equipment to navigate the oceans. Consequently, the existence 
of a provision permitting military vessels to use the high seas, accompanied by a provision 
reserving the high seas for "peaceful purposes," cannot mean that the latter prescribes a 
non-military normative standard with the former merely permitting the military, out of 
necessity, to use the high seas. Clearly, as the "peaceful purposes" clause is used in the 
RCNT, it means non-aggressive. For support, see Oxman, The Third United Nation's Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. lNT'L L. 57, 73 (1978). 
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B. The Bed and Subsoil of the High Seas 
What is commonly referred to as the deep seabed is, in a very 
general sense, that portion of the ocean floor and subsoil which 
lies beyond the continental shelf and subjacent to the waters of 
the high seas. Although not defined in the 1958 Convention, it is 
clear that the Convention implicitly situates the deep seabed at 
precisely the location mentioned since every coastal state is enti-
tled to exercise control over that portion of the bed and subsoil 
which is a natural prolongation76 of its littoral. Unlike the 1958 
Convention, Part XI of the RCNT labels the deep seabed the 
"Area" and states that it extends seaward from the outer edge of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or the continental shelf if the 
shelf extends more than two-hundred miles from the coastline.77 
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the continental shelf of a par-
ticular state may be attenuated, by definition the landward most 
boundary of the Area is located no closer than two-hundred miles 
from the littoral. 
1. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME 
As already mentioned, pursuant to the 1958 High Seas Con-
vention and Part VII of the RCNT, the waters of the high seas are 
open to all nations for purposes of navigation, overflight, fishing, 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and any other uses 
authorized by the general principles of international law.78 Per-
haps one of the most traditional, widely accepted, other uses of the 
waters of the high seas authorized by the general principles of in-
ternational law is the right of all states to utilize the high seas for 
conducting reasonable military activities. In fact, as we have seen, 
military uses as extensive and exclusive as naval maneuvers and 
nuclear weapons tests have in the past been viewed as consonant 
with this principle.79 Since article 2 of the 1958 Convention does 
not expressly apply to the bed subjacent to the waters of the high 
seas, this part of the study will examine the nature of the legal 
regime governing the uses of that portion of the bed which is situ-
ated beyond the outer perimeter of the continental shelf. 
76. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. 3. See generally Brown, The 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 187 (1970). 
77. See article 1(1), RCNT, supra note 11, at 702. 
78. See Part VII, RCNT, supra note 11, at 726. 
79. Id. 
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There can be little doubt that the legitimacy of an attempt by 
a state to subject a portion of the deep seabed to its own sover-
eignty is predicated upon the international legal character of the 
bed itself. Yet, few international legal issues have evoked dis-
agreement as vast as that concerning the character of the deep 
seabed. One group of authorities maintains that the deep seabed is 
res nullius and therefore susceptible to being subjected to the 
sovereignty of one state or a group of states.80 As a result, any 
state would legally be entitled, simultaneously with any exclusive 
use, and in order to perfect a·n explicit or tacit claim to sover-
eignty through effective occupation,81 to assert jurisdiction over 
foreign nationals in the vicinity of the use and exclude those na-
tionals from the area of use. Another group of authorities con-
tends that the deep seabed is res communis and therefore open to 
exclusive use by all states, yet beyond legitimate subjection to 
sovereignty by any .82 As a consequence, the international legal 
regime governing the deep seabed is said to be identical to that 
controlling the superjacent waters of the high seas, also viewed as 
res communis. The waters and the bed of the high seas are seen as 
identical, not sui generis. 83 
80. See The Islands of Palmas Case, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1932). Effective occupation is reflected by continuous and peaceful display of the incidents of 
sovereignty over a particular area. Specifically, it involves the taking of possession of a par-
ticular area and exercising exclusive jurisdiction therein. For the proposition that the deep 
seabed can be acquired, see Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 641, 645 (1968}. 
81. P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE 0ROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC pt. 11, 19 (1925); 1 J. 
WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-188 (1904); Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1923); 2 H. SMITH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 122 (1935). See 
also L. HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCES 25-29 (1968). 
82. G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 498-501 (1932); C. COLOM-
BOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 63-64 (1962). 
83. The 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 10, at article 2 begins: "The high seas 
being open to all .... " (emphasis added). "High seas" is defined in article 1 to include "all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
State" (emphasis added). Such broad language may support the res communis characteriza-
tion by including the seabed as well as the waters within "all parts" of the sea. This conclu-
sion seems even more compelling when one realizes that the delegate from Brazil desired to 
have the term "high seas" changed to read "waters of the high seas" (emphasis added) and 
then proposed to define "waters of the high seas" to mean "those waters lying between the 
outer limits of the territorial sea" (referring to the territorial seas of all States), 4 U.N. 
Conf. Law of the Sea 133, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.67 (1958). Mr. Pedreira (Brazil) had 
been particularly interested in delimiting not only the horizontal zones of ocean space, but 
also the vertical zones. He felt his proposal would accomplish this and confine the appli-
cabity of the principles to the water surface and column only, leaving the seabed unaffected. 
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It seems, however, that when the primary concern is simply 
exclusive military utilization, it really matters little whether the 
deep seabed is characterized as res communis or res nullius. Both 
characterizations appear to entitle all states to use the deep sea-
bed for their own exclusive purposes, even though this may in-
volve emplacing installations or devices on the bed. It appears 
that any such permanent exclusive use of a portion of the deep 
seabed does not in and of itself contravene the proscription of 
claims to, or exercises of, sovereignty implicit in the concept that 
the deep seabed is res communis .84 This conclusion seems ineluc-
table for several reasons. First, article -2 of the 1958 Convention 
clearly authorizes some exclusive permanent uses of the deep sea-
bed by explicitly stating that the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines is a freedom of the high seas; yet no one would seriously 
contend that such use would be violative of the proscription of 
sovereignty simply because the use is permanent in nature. Sec-
ond, as already recounted, exclusive military uses of the waters of 
the high seas have never been perceived as violative of the pro-
scription of sovereignty enunciated in article 2, even though some 
of these uses have been so regular in nature as to, in fact, be per-
manent.85 Finally, if permanent use contravened the proscription 
See remarks of Mr. Pedreira, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 42, para. 29, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.16 (1958). Committee II rejected, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 53, para. 
19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.20 (1958), an earlier proposal of his designed to emphasize 
the same distinction between water and seabed, 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 133, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.13/C.2/L.67 (1958), forcing him to withdraw L.66. See 4 U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 
54, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/SR.21 (1958). The rejection of one and the withdrawal 
of the other proposal may well indicate that what appears to be expansive language in arti-
cles 1 and 2 should be so construed. But see comment 2 to article 27 of the 1956 ILC Report, 
supra note 38, at 278. It reads: 
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore or ex-
ploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the case of the 
exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf ... such ex-
ploitation has not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special 
regulation. 
84. Though few have gone so far, there have been instances where coastal states 
have, without incurring objection from others, engaged in activities much more intrusive 
than some exclusive use which has temporarily or permanently precluded other states from 
using the same area. See, e.g., the passage of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act of 
1952, 19 Commonwealth Acts 64 (1952), by which Australia created a prohibited area of 
more than 6000 square miles, most of it high seas, used for conducting atomic weapons tests. 
All persons found within the area without permission were subject to criminal penalties. 
Cited and discussed in McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective: 
Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 680 (1955). 
85. See Delegation Paper, supra note 49. 
23
Zedalis: Peaceful Purposes
Published by SURFACE, 1979
24 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:1 
of claims to or exercises of sovereignty implicit in the concept that 
the deep seabed is res communis, there would technically have 
been no need to formulate specific prohibitions against the instal-
lation or emplacement of the deep seabed based weapons pro-
scribed by the SACT and the proposed SALT II agreement, since 
the deployment of such devices would have already been pro-
scribed by the notion that such permanent exclusive use is pro-
hibited. Thus, while it can be said with some degree of accuracy 
that both the res nullius and the res communis characterizations 
permit most permanent exclusive military uses of the deep sea-
bed, only the former possesses the potential for legitimizing 
claims to or exercises of sovereignty. 86 
86. As we have seen, even if the deep seabed is considered to be res communis, all 
states are entitled to use the bed for their own exclusive purposes, even though such use 
may involve emplacing installations thereon. Moreover, since this may be a reasonable use 
of the deep seabed, it seems that the utilizing state should be authorized legally to under-
take efforts to protect its use comparable to those which a state exercising a right recog-
nized by article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention is entitled to undertake in order to pro-
tect its right to use the waters of the high seas. Though efforts to actively exclude foreign 
nationals from a portion of the deep seabed would normally violate the proscription of exer-
cises of sovereignty implicit in the res communis concept, when undertaken in order to pro-
tect the exercise of a recognized right on the deep seabed, such exclusions may indeed be 
consonant with international law. 
As with every justice principle, the proscription of claims to, or exercises of, sover-
eignty offers little more than general guidance concerning the resolution of specific factual 
problems involving permanent uses of the deep seabed whenever such uses are unaccom-
panied by an explicit claim to sovereignty. Therefore, it is imperative that one appreciate 
both that the ultimate objective of the international legal decision-making process is to 
peacefully resolve competing state claims and that every general legal principle proceeds 
from a combination of several important factors which may be looked to whenever the fac-
tual circumstances being considered do not fall squarely within the ambit of the applicable 
principle. In the instant case, the several underlying factors which should be examined in 
order to determine whether any effort to protect such a use of the deep seabed is violative 
of international law include: the nature of the permanent exclusive use being protected; the 
extent of the area encompassed by such use; the degree to which such use interferes with 
uses of the immediately surrounding area by other states; whether the uses interfered with 
are exclusive or inclusive; and, if the uses interfered with are inclusive, the value of the in-
clusive uses as compared with the value of the exclusive use. A cogent argument can be 
made that circumscribed efforts to protect most permanent exclusive military uses of the 
deep seabed by excluding foreign nationals from the area of use are not violative of the pro-
scription of sovereignty implicit in the existing concept that the deep seabed is res com-
munis, since such use probably interferes most with other exclusive military uses of the 
seabed. Whether an effort undertaken to protect a permanent offensive military use of the 
deep seabed would violate the proscription of sovereignty may well turn upon whether the 
use with which such permanent use is interfering is defensible under article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. If, however, the permanent offensive mili-
tary use is substantially interfering with highly valued (i.e., economic) inclusive uses of the 
seabed by other states, then efforts to exclude foreign nationals from the area of such ex-
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2. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF PART XI OF THE RCNT 
Part XI of the RCNT proposes to establish an effective inter-
national legal regime to govern future uses of the seabed and sub-
soil beyond the EEZ or the continental shelf,86A if the shelf extends 
beyond the outer perimeter of the EEZ.87 Specifically, activities 
designed to explore for and/or exploit the natural resources of the 
Area are to be subject to the regulation and supervision of an in-
ternational body known as the "Authority."88 Other activities are 
governed by a few rules of general applicability. In view of the 
fact that we are concerned only with the international legality of 
military uses of the Area, primary attention will be given to the 
provision which reserves the Area to use exclusively for "peaceful 
purposes,"89 and the provision which prohibits any state from 
claiming or exercising sovereignty over, or appropriating, any 
part of the Area.90 However, since some military utilizations may 
be research oriented, attention will also be devoted briefly to the 
principles contained in Part XI of the RCNT which are designed to 
govern marine scientific research in the Area. Each provision is a 
significant addition to the regime articulated in the 1958 High 
Seas Convention. 
elusive use would probably be seen as violative of the proscription of assertions of or claims 
to sovereignty over the deep seabed. 
86A. The legal regime established by the RCNT to govern uses of the bed of the EEZ 
and that portion of the continental shelf extending beyond the outer perimeter of the eco-
nomic zone is such that foreign state military uses are either not allowed or subject to 
coastal state proscription. See articles 58-60, RCNT, supra note 11, at 716-717. It appears, 
however, that while the coastal state may be entitled to use the bed of its EEZ and its con-
tinental shelf for defensive military purposes, military uses of such areas which adversely 
jeopardize the interests of a foreign state or the international community are not allowed. 
See article 59, RCNT, supra note 11, at 716. 
87. This portion of seabed is known as the "Area." Article 1(1), RCNT, supra note 11, 
at 702 states: "'Area' means the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction." 
88. See generally H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS 
623-628 (1975); Adede, The System for Exploitation of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" 
at the Caracas Conference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1975); Goldie, The Contents of Davy 
Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 
(1967). 
89. Article 141, RCNT, supra note 11, at 737 reads: "The Area shall be open to use ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or land-locked, without dis-
crimination and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part." 
90. Article 137(1), RCNT, supra note 11, at 736 reads: 
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any 
part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or person, natural or juridi-
cal, appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or 
sovereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized. 
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Article 141 of the RCNT91 makes it explicitly clear that the 
Area is "open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes." The draft 
convention, however, fails to explicate the precise standard of use 
implicit in this reservation, and the travaux preparatories do not 
make up for this noticeable deficiency .92 If the provision is con-
strued to prohibit only aggressive uses of the Area specifically, 
those activities violative of article ~2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter ,93 then, absent explicit restrictions, numerous activities of 
a military nature may well be consonant with the regime.94 On the 
other hand, if the provision proscribes all military uses of the 
Area, then any activity of a military nature, whether aggressive 
or not, will undoubtedly contravene article 141.95 It should be 
noted that the nonaggressive connotation of the "peaceful pur-
poses" provision in relation to article 88 of the RCNT is not con-
trolling since the applicability of that particular provision does not 
extend beyond the waters of the high seas. Moreover, as that spe-
cific provision is applied, it is accompanied by a provision implic-
itly recognizing the right of warships to traverse the high seas. 
Consequently, the only acceptable construction of the "peaceful 
purposes" provision as used in reference to the waters of the high 
91. See article 141, RCNT, supra note 89. 
92. The meaning of "peaceful purposes" received attention at an earlier session, 5 
Third U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 54-68, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.66-68 (1976). One commen-
tator, however, has stated that the clause permits the use of listening devices on the deep-
sea floor. See M. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 85 (1976). 
93. Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
94. See 5 Third U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 56, 62, para. 81, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.62/ 
SR.67 (1976), where Mr. Learson (U.S.) stated: 
The term "peaceful purposes" did not, of course, preclude military activities gen-
erally. The United States had consistently held that the conduct of military activi-
ties for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the Charter of the United Na-
tions .... Any specific limitation on military activities would require the negotia-
tion of a detailed arms control agreement. The Conference was not charged with 
such a purpose .... 
95. See 5 Third U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 56, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.67 
(1976), where Mr. Valencia Rodriguez (Ecuador) stated: "It had already been recognized in 
many international bodies and agreements that the use of ocean space for exclusively peace-
ful purposes must mean complete demilitarization and the exclusion from it of all military 
activities." See also id. 54-56, para. 5-12, comments of Mr. Bakula (Peru). See also Rao, The 
Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1969), where he 
contends that the majority of states define "peaceful purposes" to mean non-military. On 
earlier discussions see U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1601, para. 71-72 Way be 171-172) (Trinidad and 
Tobago 1968); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1596, para. 32-36 (Romania 1968). 
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seas is the nonaggressive construction. There is no comparable 
military use expressly permitted by the draft convention in rela-
tion to the Area and, thus, no compelling analogy to be drawn. 
As observed in relation to the waters of the high seas, ambi-
guities can frequently be removed simply by construing a trouble-
some provision in the context of the entire convention, seeking to 
effectuate the general intention of the drafters as evidenced in 
both preceding and subsequent provisions. Part XI of the RCNT 
contains two important provisions which cast som-e light on the 
meaning of "peaceful purposes" as utilized in article 141. First, 
article 13696 pronounces the Area and its resources to be the "com-
mon heritage of mankind."97 However, even when construed in 
conjunction with this provision, one still cannot state categorically 
that "peaceful purposes" means to proscribe all activities of a mili-
tary nature. This is evident from the previous examination of both 
the deep seabed and the waters of the high seas, areas long 
acknowledged by many commentators to be the common heritage 
of all mankind (res communis), but areas where reasonable mili-
tary uses, not accompanied by a claim to or exercise of sovereignty, 
have been permitted. Second, article 140(1) explicitly states, in 
part, that "[a]ctivities in the Area shall be carried out for the bene-
fit of mankind as a whole."98 Language of similar import in article 
I, paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty of 196799 has prompted 
some scholars to suggest that any military activity conducted in 
outer space would transgress that specific provision because no 
military activity could possibly benefit mankind as a whole.100 The 
same cannot be said about such language in relation to the Area 
since article 133(a) of Part XI goes on 101 to define "activities in the 
96. Article 136, RCNT, supra note 11, at 736. 
97. For the origin of this concept, see U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515-1516 (Note verbale 
from Ambassador Pardo 1967), U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967), and G.A. RES. 2340 (XXII) (1967). 
See generally Arnold, The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Legal Concept, 9 INT'L LAW. 
153 (1975). 
98. Article 140, RCNT, supra note 11, at 737 reads: "Activities in the Area shall be 
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whol~. irrespective of the geographical location 
of States, . . . and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the 
developing countries .... " 
99. Article 1(1), Outer Space Treaty, supra note 70, at 2412 states: "The exploration 
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for 
the benefit and in the interests of all countries .... " 
100. See Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions in The 1967 
Outer Space Treaty , 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976). 
101. Article 133(a), RCNT, supra note 11, at 736 states: '"Activities in the Area' means 
all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area." It appears 
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Area" as specifically referring to those activities designed to ex-
plore and/or exploit the natural resources located therein. It is 
clear that this language does not cover all conduct, let alone mili-
tary conduct. Any contention that military devices or habitats in-
stalled on the sea floor and designed to provide a mechanism for 
exploring and/or exploiting ocean "space"102 come within the ambit 
of the "benefit of mankind" provision by virtue of constituting ex-
ploration for and exploitation of a resource, i.e., space, is incorrect. 
It is not only highly u~likely that surveillance or research con-
stitutes the kind of exploration or exploitation contemplated, but 
article 133 of the RCNT goes on to specifically restrict the applica-
tion of the provision to the seabed and subsoil, and defines 
"resources" to mean mineral resources,103 not resources as meta-
physical as space. 
In addition to the reservation of the Area to use exclusively 
for "peaceful purposes" as provided in article 141, Part XI of the 
RCNT contains a provision establishing a similar standard which, 
though not affecting all activities, appears to at least cover mili-
that a stronger case probably could have been made in favor of bringing surveillance 
devices within the purview of the "benefit of mankind" provision had the Informal Single 
Negotiating Text (ISNT) definition of "activities in the Area" been utilized. The relevant 
language covered "all activities of exploration of the Area .... " Nothing was said about the 
exploration having to be connected with "resource" exploration. Although this language has 
been changed in both the RCNT and the earlier ICNT, it still seems unlikely a convincing 
argument could have been made under the ISNT since surveillance was probably not the 
type of "exploration" contemplated by the provision and, nevertheless, the surveillance was 
not of the "Area" (seabed and subsoil) but rather of the ocean space immediately super-
jacent thereto. See Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, 
pt. I, art. 1 (iii), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 683 (1975). For the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 1108 (1977). 
102. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL and I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 
779-780 (1963). They designate the ocean a "spatial-extension resource" with the most dis-
tinctive characteristic being its utility as a medium of transportation and communication. 
After stating that the ocean, land, airspace and outer space constitute the most noticeable 
examples, they continue: 
The land masses obviously contain various stock and flow resources, as do the 
oceans and air space and outer space. The particular reference we make is, how-
ever, to the spatial or extension quality of the resource which makes it a highly ad-
vantageous medium of transportation and communication; for present purposes, 
the material aspects of the resources are relevant, not for their characteristics as 
flow or stock resources, but because they form a surface or extension which can be 
made use of for movement. 
103. Article 133(b), RCNT, supra note 11, at 736 states in part: "'Resources' means 
mineral resources in situ." 
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tary research conducted on the floor of the Area or in the subsoil 
thereof. This provision is article 143(1). It states, in pertinent 
part, that "[m]arine scientific research in the Area shall be carried 
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of man-
kind as a whole .... "104 Although scholars who are not favorably 
disposed toward military uses of the deep seabed may feel con-
strained to interpret this provision as proscribing all research of a 
military nature, including weapons testing, careful examination 
fails to sustain such all encompassing construction. 
The requirement in article 143(1) that marine scientific re-
search be carried out "exclusively for peaceful purposes" does not 
appear to proscribe all scientific research of a military nature. 
This conclusion is derived from the consistency of such a construc-
tion with the interpretation of "peaceful purposes" as used else-
where in the RCNT (articles 88 and 141), the absence of a provi-
sion explicitly prohibiting such traditional activity, and the fact 
that reading "peaceful purposes" as prohibiting scientific research 
of a military nature would produce the anomalous result of having 
one provision (article 143(1)) proscribe relatively innocuous 
research activity while provisions found elsewhere in Part XI (ar-
ticles 136, 140(1), and 141) permit other extensive military uses 
consistent with principles of international law. Nor does it appear 
that the requirement that such activity be carried out for the 
"benefit of mankind as a whole" significantly affects the inter-
pretation concerning the impact of article 143(1) on scientific 
research of a military nature. Though admittedly some may argue 
that no military activity can benefit mankind as a whole, it seems 
that scientific research is distinct from what is typically viewed as 
military activity. Specifically, while traditional military activity 
can benefit either the acting nation alone or the acting nation plus 
all others, except those against which it is directed, recent history 
has demonstrated that almost all scientific activity, albeit military 
in nature, produces some useful non-military applications. 
Moreover, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish most military from most non-military scientific 
research. Certainly such an attempt could not turn upon the 
character of those conducting the activity, particularly since 
military scientists are generally in the forefront of scientific ac-
tivities in transnational spatial areas. And, finally, as mentioned in 
104. Article 143(1), RCNT, supra note 11, at 738. 
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relation to the requirement that marine scientific research be car-
ried out exclusively for "peaceful purposes," construing any provi-
sion in article 143(1) as proscribing military research produces the 
anomalous result of outlawing innocuous activities while provi-
sions elsewhere in Part XI permit other extensive military uses of 
the Area. 
The mere fact that articles 141 and 143(1) of the RCNT cannot 
reasonably be construed as proscribing all activities of a military 
nature, or even military surveillance and research, does not neces-
sarily mean that such activities may be carried on without legal 
restriction. In this respect, article 137(1) of the RCNT provides: 
No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign 
rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any 
State or person, natural or juridical, appropriate any part 
thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign 
rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized (emphasis 
added).105 
The effect of such language is to indicate clearly that no state 
may claim or exercise sovereignty over any portion of the Area. 
Though mere extensive and exclusive use apparently does not 
contravene the prohibition since, as noted in relation to article 2 of 
the 1958 Convention, all uses of ocean space necessarily operate to 
exclude any simultaneous use of the same area by another state,1°6 
there is little doubt that both the exercise of jurisdiction over for-
eign nationals locate~ within the parameters of the Area and the 
assertion of any occlusive authority are strictly forbidden. The 
prohibition against any claim to or exercise of sovereignty does 
not ipso facto prevent military utilization of the Area. After all, 
most military activities constitute mere exclusive use and involve 
neither a claim to sovereignty nor an exercise sufficient to give 
rise to any claim to sovereignty. 
Article 137(1) of the RCNT also contains a proscription of 
State appropriation of any portion of the seabed and subsoil 
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a proscription 
which may well affect certain military uses of the Area. It seems 
rather self evident that the inclusion of appropriation among the 
list of prohibited state activities clearly indicates an intention to 
go beyond a simple denunciation of claims to, or exercises of, sover-
105. Article 137(1), RCNT, supra note 11. 
106. See Part XI Section 3, RCNT, supra note 11, at 738. 
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eignty. If this were not so, there would have been no need to include 
a term perceived as a mere recitation of previously proscribed 
conduct. 
Neither the RCNT nor the travaux preparatories developed 
in relation thereto contain any definitive statement as to the' 
meaning of the term "appropriation."107 It seems, however, safe to 
say that while the term may well have been designed primarily to 
proscribe efforts to remove mineral resources from the seabed, 
the fact that it is not so specifically limited leads to the conclusion 
that it also proscribes conduct or activities _not extensive enough 
to constitute an explicit or tacit claim to sovereignty. Therefore, 
the mere fact that a certain military use is not sufficient to contra-
vene the prohibition of claims to, or exercises of, sovereignty over 
any portion of the Area, does not mean such activity is authorized 
by international law. If the use amounts to an appropriation, then, 
despite the fact it may comport with all other principles enunci-
ated in the draft convention, it is apparently prohibited. 
In summation then, whether "peaceful purposes" is construed 
alone or in conjunction with the "common heritage" or the "bene-
fit of mankind" provision, it lacks sufficient normative clarity to 
107. Before the first session of UNCLOS III, many seabed issues were debated by the 
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction. In 1973, Subcommittee I forwarded a draft convention to 
UNCLOS III which contained several alternative provisions, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, 54, 
U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973). Alternative draft article 4 read: 
(A) Neither the Area nor (its resources nor) any part thereof shall be subject 
to appropriation by any means whatsoever, by States or persons natural or juri-
dical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over the 
Area or (its resources or) any part thereof; nor, except as hereinafter otherwise 
specified in these articles, shall any state or any person, natural or juridical claim, 
acquire, or exercise any rights over the resources of the Area or of any part 
thereof. Subject to the foregoing, no such claims or exercise of such rights shall be 
recognized. 
(B) 1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
any part of the sea-bed or the subsoil thereof. States Parties to this Treaty shall 
not recognize any such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights. 
2. Similarly, the sea-bed and subsoil thereof shall not be subject to 
appropriation by any means, by States or persons, natural or juridical. 
The precise meaning of "appropriation" was never clarified. Moreover, it never appeared in 
the 1971 Report, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), nor the 1972 Report, 27 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972). However, in 1971 Canada submitted a paper 
to the Committee, International Sea-Bed Regime and Machinery Working Paper, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.138/59, cited in 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, 205 U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), which contained 
at 206 an article prohibiting "appropriation." In explanation it said: 
Bearing in mind international experience with various uses of the high seas ... it 
would also be advisable to give a clearer indication in the treaty as to what might 
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proscribe all activities of a military nature within the Area.108 
Neither the RCNT nor the working documents indicate any con-
sensus as to the meaning of the clause. Moreover, the "common 
heritage" provision merely operates to prohibit assertions of 
sovereignty over the Area, while the "benefit of mankind" provi-
sion governs only activities designed to explore and/or exploit the 
mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the Area. 
Any explicit claim to sovereignty over a portion of the Area is 
proscribed. Claims implicit in any assertion that a portion of the 
Area is closed to foreign nationals, or the exercise of jurisdiction 
over such nationals found within a portion of the Area, are simi-
larly proscribed. Since Part XI of the RCNT fails to expressly pro-
hibit every possible exclusive use of the Area, it appears that 
many military uses continue unaffected unless it can be shown in-
dubitably that "peaceful purposes" proscribes all activities of a 
military nature. Even if this cannot be demonstrated, those exclu-
sive military activities exhibiting some indication of permanency 
are prohibited by the proscription of appropriation. 
IV. APPRAISAL OF THE EXISTING AND THE 
PROPOSED REGIME 
Any desirable international legal regime designed to govern 
possible military uses of the water surface, the navigable water 
column, the bed, and the subsoil of the high seas, must be com-
prised of three essential components. First, the regime must em-
constitute a form of appropriation falling short of a claim or exercise of sover-
eignty or sovereign rights (a question which is closely related both to the scope of 
activities to be governed by the regime and to the reservation of the sea-bed for 
exclusively peaceful purposes). To this end "appropriation" might be defined to 
mean any exclusive use or denial of the right of access not provided for in the 
treaty (emphasis added). 
Though denial of the right of access is surely appropriation, it will be demonstrated that to 
proclaim mere exclusive use an appropriation is unwise. 
108. Mr. Bavand (Iran) recapitulated the various interpretations voiced at UNCLOS 
III, 5 Third U.N. Conf. Law of the Sea 56, 65, para. 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.68 (1976): 
Three trends of thought seemed to emerge .... Many States had taken the view 
that "peaceful purposes" meant the prohibition of all military activities, including 
activities by military personnel, on the sea-bed. Other States interpreted the prin-
ciple as prohibiting all military activities for offensive purposes, but not, for in-
stance, the use of military means of communication or the use of military person-
nel for scientific purposes. A third group of States maintained that the test of 
whether an activity was peaceful was whether it was consistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations and other obligations of international law (emphasis added). 
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body verifiable obligations. That is, the prescriptions articulated 
must be such that it is easy to verify the extent to which the obli-
gations reflected therein are being complied with. Second, the 
regime must proscribe all activities which jeopardize the balance 
of existing strategic military forces. Lastly, the regime must not 
be such that it stimulates efforts to shift the locus of strategic con-
flict toward the high seas. 
It would be difficult to obtain any significant military advan-
tage by violating the principles of such a regime because the viola-
tions would be easily detected and thus could be compensated for 
quickly. Moreover, since the effect of strategic conflict would 
directly impact urban/industrial centers, such a regime should in-
duce nations to act with moderation during periods of international 
crisis. Additionally, such a regime would assure the continued in-
vulnerability and value of the SSBN and, thereby, preserve inter-
national stability and state security by maintaining the balance of 
a significant, and perhaps the most important, portion of the ex-
isting strategic force structure. Continued invulnerability of the 
SSBN should guarantee the existence of an adequate, assured 
retaliatory capability, while exposing urban/industrial centers to 
the effects of strategic conflict should serve to temper hasty inter-
national political decisions and encourage efforts for effective 
arms control and eventual arms reduction. 
Measured against such desiderata, it appears that, with re-
spect to the water surface and the navigable water column of the 
high seas, the 1958 Convention has already established, and Part 
VII of the RCNT proposes to leave intact, a relatively attractive 
international legal regime governing military utilization of such 
areas. A close reading reveals that neither document purports to 
articulate an unverifiable, totally proscriptive regime. Indeed, all 
reasonable military activities on the surface or in the navigable 
water column, including the deployment of virtually undetectable 
water column sonic detection devices and free floating anti-sub-
marine mines, continue to be permitted. Given the possibility that 
a nation violating a regime proscribing such undetectable activity 
might mistakenly assume that, as a result of the violation, it ob-
tained some temporary military edge convertible into an interna-
tional political advantage, the fact that such undetectable activity 
is not proscribed should promote stability by encouraging nations 
to remain alert to all those difficult to detect, legally permissible 
activities which may prove menacing. 
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Notwithstanding the permissive regime established by the 
1958 Convention and reiterated in Part VII of the RCNT, it ap-
pears that the military activities which are authorized will neither 
substantially threaten the status of existing strategic forces nor 
serve to accelerate technological and doctrinal trends toward 
shifting the locus of strategic conflict from presently targeted in-
habited areas to the waters of the high seas. In fact, of the legally 
permissible existing and foreseeable military uses of the water 
surface and the navigable water column of the deep seas men-
tioned in Section II, only ASW activity presents any significant 
threat to the composition of strategic military forces 109 and pro-
vides the opportunity for redirecting the locus of strategic con-
flict. Naval maneuvers, weapons testing, and the deployment of 
Polaris/Poseidon missile launching nuclear submarines contribute 
more to than they detract from international stability. Yet, given 
the circumscribed range of water column sonic detection devices 
and free floating anti-submarine weapons, a regime which author-
izes the deployment of ASW devices and weapons should neither 
jeopardize the invulnerability of the SSBN nor contribute measur-
ably to the growing interest in militarization of the high seas. 
With respect to the deep seabed and subsoil thereof, it ap-
pears that if the delegates to UNCLOS III adopt provisions simi-
lar to those found in Part XI of the RCNT, they will remedy many 
of the deficiencies in the provisions of the existing legal regime 
affecting military uses of such areas. The fact that even the res 
communis characterization sanctions all reasonable military uses 
of the bed and subsoil below the high seas which are not accom-
panied by efforts designed to subject the areas of use to state 
sovereignty means, essentially, that such areas may be used pres-
ently as sites for the erection of huge sonic detection devices 
capable of insonifying all of the ocean space, the deployment of 
sophisticated ASW weapons systems such as the Captor anti-sub-
marine mine and its successors, the establishment of research 
aquahabitats with the capacity to serve as underwater submarine 
depots, and, but for the SACT, SALT II, the LTB, and the ABM 
Treaty, 110 the testing and deployment of seabed based stationary 
109. See generally Baxter, The Legal Aspects of Arms Control Measures Concerning 
the Missile Carrying Submarines and Anti-Submarine Warfare in FUTURE OF SEA-BASED 
DETERRENT 209, 221 (1973). 
110. See content for notes 33-36. 
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and mobile offensive and defensive strategic missile systems. If 
one of the superpowers should actually undertake such activities, 
a strategic asymmetry of sorts could well develop 111 and the deep 
seabed could well become the locus of strategic conflict. 
Part XI of the RCNT would do two things to correct the defi-
ciencies in the existing regime. First, it would establish a set of 
conventional principles directly applicable to the deep seabed. 
Secondly, it would go beyond the mere proscription of claims to or 
assertions of sovereignty reflected in the notion that the deep sea-
bed is res communis by prohibiting all states from appropriating 
any portion of the Area. As a result, although exclusive tempo-
rary military uses would continue to be permitted, 112 all exclusive 
uses which exhibited an indication of permanency evidenced, per-
haps, by installation or affixation to the seabed, would be pro-
hibited. 
It is quite clear that a proscriptive regime of the character of 
that found in Part XI of the RCNT would, unlike the existing per-
missive regime, preserve the balance of strategic forces and 
assure that the locus of strategic conflict would not be redirected 
from presently targeted urban/industrial centers toward the deep 
seabed. Moreover, even though the high seas is admittedly vast 
and susceptible to many inconspicuous military uses, such a pro-
scriptive regime would establish easily verifiable obligations since 
any effort to successfully erect sonic detection devices, capable of 
insonifying ocean space, on the deep seabed, advanced long-range 
ASW weapons needed to effectively threaten the SSBN, or re-
search aquahabitats which may be used for ominous military activ-
ity, would necessarily require a large scale task force stationed on 
the water surface working for a considerable period of time. As a 
consequence, it would be virtually impossible for such efforts to 
escape detection. Once such activity is detected, efforts could be 
undertaken to quickly restore the strategic balance. This feature 
should serve to militate against the temptation to circumvent the 
obligations reflected in Part XI of the RCNT. 
111. See w. BURKE, TOWARDS BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN 88-89 (1969). 
112. See content for notes 103-106. 
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